“Post-war Gaza needs a governing authority that no current party trusts—so the world is being asked to build one from scratch.” The Board of Peace is a proposed multinational administrative and oversight body designed to govern the transition period in Gaza following the cessation of active hostilities, with a mandate covering humanitarian administration, reconstruction funding allocation, security coordination, and the eventual pathway to Palestinian self-governance.
Executive Summary
Proposals for a Board of Peace emerged from Gulf, European, and U.S. diplomatic tracks in 2024–2025 as an alternative to both Hamas governance and a weakened Palestinian Authority assuming administrative control of post-war Gaza. The core design challenge is structural: Israel will not accept PA governance without security guarantees the PA cannot provide; Arab states will not contribute reconstruction funding without governance structures that exclude both Hamas and direct Israeli control; and the U.S. under Trump separately floated a “riviera” redevelopment concept that sidelined institutional governance frameworks entirely. The BoP concept attempts to thread this needle by proposing a technocratic oversight layer—funded by Gulf states, legitimized by Arab League endorsement, and tolerated by Israel as a Hamas-exclusion mechanism.
The Strategic Mechanism
The Board of Peace framework operates across four functional domains:
- Humanitarian administration: Coordinating aid flows, refugee services, and civilian infrastructure restoration through a depoliticized technical body that bypasses Hamas-affiliated administrative structures.
- Reconstruction fund governance: Managing international pledges—estimated at $50–80 billion in requirements—through a transparent multilateral mechanism designed to satisfy Gulf donor accountability demands and prevent fund diversion.
- Security coordination: Interfacing with Israeli security requirements and potential Arab state security contributions (Jordan, Egypt, UAE have all been discussed as potential troop contributors) under a defined legal mandate.
- Political transition pathway: Establishing a timeline and conditions for transferring governance to a reformed Palestinian Authority or a newly constituted Palestinian governance body with democratic legitimacy.
Market & Policy Impact
- Gulf sovereign fund exposure: Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar have conditioned reconstruction contributions on governance frameworks that exclude Hamas and include credible accountability mechanisms—making BoP institutional design a prerequisite for capital mobilization.
- Israeli political constraints: Any Board of Peace arrangement requires Knesset-compatible security provisions, limiting the governance mandate’s scope and complicating international legitimacy.
- U.S.-Arab alignment tension: Trump’s February 2025 proposal to depopulate Gaza and develop it as a U.S.-administered “riviera” directly contradicted the BoP’s premise, creating diplomatic turbulence with Arab partners who made clear that any solution must maintain Palestinian presence and rights.
- UN parallel structures: UNRWA’s contested status (Israel demanded its dissolution; the U.S. cut its funding in 2025) created an institutional vacuum that BoP proposals partially address but do not fully resolve.
- Reconstruction financing instruments: World Bank, IsDB, and Gulf development funds are developing Gaza-specific financing vehicles contingent on governance framework resolution—a multi-billion dollar pipeline awaiting institutional clarity.
Modern Case Study: The NCAG Parallel and Gulf Governance Proposals, 2024–2025
In parallel with BoP discussions, Arab League members advanced the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) as a transitional technocratic body. Egypt and Jordan were central proponents, proposing a committee of Palestinian technocrats—drawn from Fatah-aligned civil society but formally independent—to administer civilian affairs in coordination with international donors. The UAE and Saudi Arabia signaled conditional support contingent on Israeli acceptance of a credible political horizon for Palestinian statehood. By late 2025, neither the BoP nor the NCAG had achieved operational status, but the frameworks had become the dominant template for diplomatic negotiations—effectively defining the institutional design space within which any Gaza reconstruction deal would need to operate. Their existence signals that Gulf states are no longer willing to fund reconstruction absent governance structures that provide both accountability and a Hamas-exclusion mechanism.